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Professional Philosophy, “Diversity,” and
Racist Exclusion: On Van Norden’s Taking
Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto
Grant J. Silva

Marquette University
This following essay uses Bryan W. Van Norden’s Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto (2017) to
articulate several reasons for why diversification efforts in professional philosophy face an uphill battle. Besides
methodological, material, and “ideological” obstacles, diversity initiatives in academic philosophy are often
commandeered and result in tokenization rather than diversification. On top of that, many professional
philosophers view calls for diversification as an additional burden levied upon philosophy departments, one that
comes not from genuine philosophical interests but from a cultural atmosphere that is increasingly under the
influence of political correctness and identity politics. As such, diversification is antithetical to the furtherance of
“real philosophy” and often amounts to a waste of time and money. Methodologically, or so the thought goes,
one cannot find a discipline that is more disserved by administrative efforts, or the vociferous complaints of
members of philosophy departments, to “diversify.”
Some of these claims manifest in Van Norden’s book, and as nonwhite Mexican-American in professional
philosophy, I must admit that I am happy to see more “mainstream” (read “white”) philosophers willing to
engage in this type of metaphilosophical debate. That being said, whereas Taking Back Philosophy poses a series

of internal challenges to professional philosophy, it pales in comparison to the critical work on the diversification
of philosophy done from the margins of academic philosophy, from the decolonial, Latin American, indigenous,
feminist, and Africana thought of the past three decades. These traditions are not only “diverse,” but they also
problematize and critically challenge the professionalized practice of philosophy today. I therefore find it
frustrating (but am not surprised) that Van Norden’s book garners professional uptake whereas the work of
nonwhites, women, and philosophers from the “formerly” colonial world remain relatively ignored. This book’s
success, in this sense, is also its failure.
You might be thinking that this line of thought is slightly unfair given that Van Norden’s comparative endeavors
are primarily between Eastern and Western perspectives (as he admits throughout the book). To hold him
accountable for not working in the aforementioned traditions is off the mark. Therein lies the problem. It is
unfortunate, bear with me, that Van Norden specializes in Chinese philosophy and strives to work from those
traditions he is most familiar with. “Unfortunate” because this will reinforce the idea that Taking Back
Philosophy is essentially about the need for more Chinese philosophy (or, generally speaking, “Asian”
philosophy) in our profession. While of course valuable to the profession, “Asian philosophy” is the most
tolerable form of “diversity” in professional philosophy today; it is many a philosopher’s go-to interpretation of
“non- Western” or “comparative philosophy.” In saying this, I do not mean to disregard the philosophical
systems and longstanding traditions/debates that fall under the umbrella of “Asian philosophy,” but I am
frequently shocked by how this area of specialization is fetishized and used for ideological purposes by
professional philosophers, as I explain below.
I can put this concern in the form of a question. Van Norden’s book is clever enough to succeed in making some
philosophers uncomfortable to the point that they take the plunge into what passes for “comparative
philosophy” in the profession these days. Would Van Norden’s book be as effective if its main point of
comparison was the experience of people of color in the United States, Nahuatl thought (the philosophy of the
“Aztec” people), or even feminist philosophy, rather than Chinese philosophy? Would Van Norden’s argument,
particularly constructed with Chinese philosophy in mind, work for Latin American philosophy? While Van
Norden calls for a truly global and not globalized conception of philosophy, to borrow language from David Hall,1
it is a call that, unfortunately, will fall upon orientalist ears. (Just to be clear, I mean Edward Said’s use of
“orientalism.”)
Unless Van Norden’s claims are taken farther, they might not help achieve the goals his book sets out to
accomplish. Moreover, in terms of the text itself, there is an unspoken tension between the call for
diversification and his attempt to demonstrate the value of philosophical inquiry in the sociopolitical and
historical contexts of today (the social contexts that led to Trump!). This is a tension that many will exploit in
order to evade diversification efforts, a point I return to in my closing. Overall, while the book is a start (albeit a
late one) to the debate about the value of “philosophy” in a rapidly changing world, Taking Back Philosophy fails
address the deeper reasons for why diversification efforts are stymied. It also fails to adequately address the
complexity of the issues surrounding “diversity” in professional philosophy today.

Diversity and Philosophy: On Suicidal Tendencies
Taking Back Philosophy problematizes the supposed (and self-assumed) universality of Anglo- European
philosophy (chapter 1). It provides an excellent example of what comparative philosophy ought to look like
(chapters 2), and points out the racism, xenophobia, blatant ethnocentrism, and fear operative in academia
today (chapter 3). It also helps to explain the anti-intellectualism of our present cultural and political climate
(chapter 4) and aspires to restore a sense of philosophy as vocation (chapter 5). Succinctly put (at least when it
comes to chapters devoted to the diversification of professional philosophy), Van Norden’s central claim is that
“[p]hilosophy must diversify or die.”2 Throughout my relatively short tenure in academic philosophy, I have

relied upon this slogan time and time again with mixed results. I am sad to say, however, that if faced with the
option between diversification and departmental “death,” the latter is what many, if not most, tenured
philosophers would prefer.3 Indeed, if my experiences in professional philosophy have taught me anything, it is
that many, especially those who are resistant to change, would rather see the ship sink, so to speak, than keep it
afloat with women, racialized minorities, members of LGTBQ communities, and/or non- Western philosophical
interests at the helm: “It just would not be philosophy anymore!” (Of course, this is not true of all departments
or tenured professors of philosophy, but a lot—I would wager a majority.)
The reasons for such a stark claim are manifold. Probably the most important stems from a collective conflict of
interests shared by many professional philosophers. A majority of persons occupying tenure-stream positions in
departments and universities throughout the globe—especially in English-speaking countries and former
colonial metropoles—have professional, economic, and personal investments in the philosophical status quo (in
which diversity is minimally important). They are disincentivized when it comes to diversity since, in the eyes of
many professional philosophers, it would entail the loss of tradition and “prestige,” the abandonment of rigor
(or so it is assumed), and the dissolution of the aura of sophistication and deference that is often evoked upon
mentioning to someone that one is a professor of philosophy (or some other vain reason). Absent these, or so
the idea goes, much of the money allocated to departmental budgets, faculty lines, salaries, and competitive
research grants would be lost (since who would ever find philosophy attractive or take it seriously in its new
multicultural garb?). Diversification efforts are seen as a direct attack on philosophical specialization, even
though one can argue it will lead to new specialties and the broadening of philosophy on the whole (these
efforts might even attract new crops of undergraduates into the discipline who might then find more
“mainstream” areas interesting). On top of all this, subjective preferences and biases, and indeed racism,
sexism, and other forms of prejudice disallow “diversity” efforts to be full realized; they are often
commandeered or result in tokenized hiring. Revealing a nefarious conflation of self and community, many
philosophers are threatened by change, such that if one’s department or the field as a whole rapidly transforms
then their individual status as a “philosopher” is called into question. In order for one to thrive as the
philosopher she or he is today, professional philosophy has to remain the same (if not even be made great
again!).4
For these reasons (and others), nothing short of generational turn-over, via retirement or other means, will
allow for the widespread adoption of what Van Norden writes of: the replacement of one species of philosopher
with another altogether,5 or, at the very least, a new crop of philosophers less invested in the way things are.
Diversification efforts require the full support of administrators, including deans and provosts. They often have
to force change. Perhaps flying the face of Van Norden’s attempt, you will not convince many philosophers to do
right in terms of the inclusion of racialized minorities, women, and LGBTQ communities—a telling and sad point
that echoes the anti- intellectualism he describes. Arguments pertaining to the well-being of philosophy
departments or the need for attracting majors will rarely work (again, sink the ship!). Neither will clever gambits
that ask philosophers to own up about the fact that they speak on behalf of only a portion of humanity and not
all of it, as Van Norden and Jay Garfield dared to suggest in their New York Times op-ed. For diversification to be
successful, you need as much faculty support as possible, financial investment and commitment from colleges
and administrations, and the blatant disregard of racist, sexist, and homophobic perspectives (there should not
be any reasoning with the unreasonable—I have seen department chairs commit this folly only to reveal their
own conservative preferences in the process). You cannot learn from or find value in another individual when
you do not view them or their identity as a valid locus for knowledge-production. To make matters worse,
forcing one to think in your terms typically results in their work being derivative not to mention inauthentic.

Methodological Blinders and the White Light
Attempts at “diversifying” professional academic philosophy take many shapes and forms. Some of these
attempts seek to increase the number of people of color and/or women in the field but keep in place the current
research interests, the types of courses offered by philosophy departments, and the range of experience or
sources for knowledge considered pertinent to philosophical inquiry. Other attempts at diversification paint a
more global picture of philosophy and strive to expand the variety or range of questions considered
“philosophical” but are not necessarily concerned with changing the face of philosophy. The best forms of
philosophical diversification do both, that is, they increase the number of people of color and women in
professional philosophy as well as incorporate more “projects of color” (see below) into the mainstream. They
also do not demand the complete overlap of the two—that is to say, they do not leave it up to the minorities
and women to do all the work. That being said, increasing the number of white people (men in particular)
studying “non-Western” philosophy does not diversify philosophy; neither does offering admission into “club
philosophy” to racialized minorities, women, and those from the “formerly” colonized world albeit on terms
requiring their assimilation into well-established philosophical questions, methods, and problematics.
Philosophical diversity requires a change in personnel as well as thematic adjustment, the type of which the
pervasive whiteness of professional philosophy will not allow for.
In “Philosophy Raced. Philosophy Erased,” Charles Mills explains that philosophers of color face an assortment
of challenges upon entering the ranks of professional philosophy.6 Some of these include implicit and explicit
racial/gender biases, microaggressions, double standards, forms of tokenization, and outright hostility or
animosity. All of these, unfortunately, have come to be expected by racialized minorities entering academic
philosophy (which does not make them right). The most perplexing and unique challenge faced by philosophers
of color, Mills continues, is the relegation of the types of interpersonal, structural, and historical issues faced by
racialized minorities to the status of “non-philosophy.” In particular, Mills has in mind questions on race and
processes of racialization, but one can easily add racism, sexism, colonization, slavery, various forms of
objectification and denigration, political marginalization, economic exploitation (as women and/or people of
color), and more, all of which I referred to as “projects of color” above.
The relegation of projects of color to the status of non-philosophy comes from certain metaphilosophical
commitments and specific ideals about the end goal of philosophical thought. In comparison to other fields,
such as literature, sociology, or history, philosophy aspires to ask perennial questions, those that span space and
time and place one on a discursive level where they can think alongside of the great minds of history.
“Philosophy is supposed to be abstracting away from the contingent, the corporeal, the temporal, the material,
to get at necessary, spiritual, eternal, ideal truths,” writes Mills.7 From this perspective, the range of questions
that fall into the domain of philosophy ought not include those that lack broad appeal. Questions devoted to
race and processes of racialization, therefore, are of limited relevance to “philosophers” on account of being
“local,” particular, too corporeal (as it were), and mostly of interest to “minorities.” It is not that white
philosophers altogether lack interest in any of the above concerns; many do work on and find such topics
interesting (such that my use of “projects of color” might even be offensive to some). Nevertheless, Mills’
analysis centers on the way questions connected to race are considered (at best) “applied” issues, “special
topics,” the ever so charitable “non-ideal theory,” or whatever term is used to confer peripheral, tangential,
outlier-status as not really philosophy.
A major reason (but definitely not the only one) for this type of marginalization is the fact that the hegemonic
group of individuals traditionally associated with being “philosophers” lack the range of perspective or
experiences often shared by people of color. To make matters worse, this group also inhabits positions of
racialized normativity. Using political philosophy as an example, Mills explains that the experiential starting
point for people of color, generally speaking, runs contrary to the basic assumptions about political subjectivity

maintained by “mainstream” thinkers. He writes, “Your moral equality and personhood are certainly not
recognized; you are not equal before the law; and the state is not seeking to protect but to encroach upon your
interests in the interests of the white population.”8 In the contexts of the United States racial imaginary, African
Americans are fundamentally viewed as criminal and dangerous; the existence of Latinx peoples is predicated on
tropes of “illegality.” While the rights of Blacks and Hispanics might be protected nominally, these protections
are not automatically granted in our society but must be continuously fought for and asserted, a point that gives
new meaning to the idea of racial privilege. All this is to say, a metaphysically stable and legally secure political
subjectivity is something political philosophers can take for granted only when the class of individuals who make
up professional philosophy are treated the same by the law, show up in similar ways in terms of political
representation, and also share a similar range of normative concerns. Thus, when relying upon one’s (white
racial) self as a frame of reference for discussion of rights or political organization (or even when designing
syllabi!), it is quite possible that, in academic contexts where a majority of peers inhabit more or less the same
circle of privilege as you, the particularity of your view is obscured and the experience of “unraced” whites
becomes the norm, as Mills puts it.
I offer the question of political justice as it relates to undocumented immigrants or irregular migration as a
classic example. At the onset of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls explains that his main object of inquiry is justice,
the basic structure of society.9 Seeking a simple conception of justice, Rawls limits his project in two ways (one
of which is important here): “I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice
for the basic structure of society conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other
societies”.10 In The Law of Peoples, he adds “this position views society as closed: persons enter only by birth,
and exit only by death.”11 In Political Liberalism (1996), Rawls continues: “That a society is closed is a
considerable abstraction, justified only because it enables us to speak about certain main questions free from
distracting details.”12 Besides reducing the plight of undocumented peoples to a “distracting detail,” Rawls’
restriction betrays his own principles by providing too much information regarding the persons behind the
famed “veil of ignorance.” When formulating the basic principles upon which the structure of society will
depend, we may not know if we are rich, poor, black, white, able-bodied or not, male or female, gay or straight,
but we do know that everyone behind the veil will be a “citizen” or, at the very least, have regular status.
Through this restriction Rawls limits justice, in its most basic form, to those who are formal members of the
body politic, a move that in the context of the United States alienates upwards of twelve million undocumented
people from the basic structure of society (i.e., justice). Unless such a limitation is justifiable, which is to say that
the burden is upon Rawlsians to show how citizenship is not an arbitrary starting point for a theory of justice
(again, appealing to Rawls’ own standards), how can the range of justice, in its most basic form, be so narrow?
In asking the above, my goal is not to engage the burgeoning literature on the ethics of immigration. Instead,
building upon what Mills writes, I demonstrate how many of the assumptions that “mainstream” philosophy rest
upon, like taking citizenship or more abstractly “membership” for granted when constructing a theory of justice,
reflects a rather particular perspective committed to a specific set of normative concerns. Now, imagine this
happening in the aggregate, adding things like prestige and pedigree, canon formation, the weight of tradition,
and the “need for rigor” into the mix.13 One can easily see how many of those intellectual endeavors that might
attract and welcome more nonwhite people into the philosophy are jettisoned (I am tempted to say “deported”)
to ethnic studies, area studies, women and gender studies, etc.
Before moving on, it is important to underscore that philosophers of color are not only interested in so-called
projects of color. Neither is it the case that all minorities in philosophy think in essentialized ways that
correspond with race, gender, or sexuality. To make such an assumption would be as oppressive and totalizing
as the other injustices nonwhite philosophers put up with. Nevertheless, my concern is with those individuals
who would argue that race has nothing to do with philosophy; with those who dismiss the epistemic salience of

social identity in philosophy altogether. Moreover, it is not merely the numerical overrepresentation of whites
that leads to the alienation of minorities in philosophy. Mills’ ultimate concern is with gate-keeping
methodological constraints and “border-building” tactics that simultaneously curtail the diversification of
philosophy as well as the obscure the particularity of those concerns passing themselves off as “universal.”
Through this process, professional philosophy remains overpopulated by white people (men in particular) and
dominated by white interests passing themselves off as race-less philosophical concerns.
For additional support take Plato’s Republic. On my read, this book is essentially about justice as it unfolds at
both the political and individual levels, and the justification for why reason ought to govern nonreason. For
Plato, justice amounts to a kind of harmony or balance. A properly aligned or “balanced” psyche means that
one’s reason dominates their more beastly parts, i.e., their passions/spirits and physical needs. Similarly, a just
society requires an organic social totality wherein the rational parts of the body-politic command the nonrational. Plato’s right, in my opinion, to think that what you put into a society you get out at the individual level:
if society is just, the people in it will be just. I believe the inverse is also true. If your society is predicated on
injustice, the people within it will be incapable of a “balanced soul.” In this sense, think of W.E.B. Du Bois’ idea of
double- consciousness. An African-American man who lived during that time in American history when black
people were emancipated but nevertheless unfree (1868–1963), Du Bois describes the feeling of having a split
or fractured self in his seminal work The Souls of Black Folk. He writes, “It is a peculiar sensation, this doubleconsciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by
the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a
Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”14 Du Bois has his self-consciousness, his “self,” but when
introspecting he’s also forced to factor in the opinion of others, namely whites. While some might think that this
is something all people do, that is, we all have to factor the opinion of others into our identity-construction, not
all do it equally. Imagine being black and having to filter all of one’s exchanges with whites knowing that they
view you first and foremost as threatening, criminal, or rapacious. From this perspective, of what value is a
balanced soul when suffering from double-consciousness? Can Du Bois achieve harmony of the soul without one
part of his “self” dominating the other? In a racialized context burdened by white supremacy, allowing “reason”
to command “nonreason” means something quite different than what Plato had in mind.
Following Mills, my point is to demonstrate how the experiential starting-point for much of philosophy is white
normativity. Those inhabiting white normativity are privileged to only have to deal with problems of the mind
and not those problems generated by the racist minds in their midst. And even though a case can be made that
white people too are incapable of achieving a balanced soul in a society predicated on white supremacy, they
are capable of evading this question in most philosophy courses. The sense of whiteness that permeates
profesional philosophy is a byproduct of methodological assumptions that run deeper than simply suggesting
that if philosophy departments do not diversify, then they should own up to their ethnocentrism. Garfield
captures what I mean when he writes that “ignoring non-Western philosophy in our research, curriculum, and
hiring decisions is deeply racist, and is a practice we cannot endorse in good faith once we recognize this.” (Too
bad he walks this claim back).15

The Semiotics of “Diversity”: On Philosophical Orientalism
While it is one thing to “diversify” philosophy, it is quite another to empower “epistemes” of difference. Van
Norden’s argument for why Chinese philosophy deserves greater coverage in U.S. universities needs to be
considered in light of this claim. He offers a valid argument that hinges on China’s increasing relevance on a
global scale, the richness of this tradition, and the overwhelming whiteness of philosophy in English-speaking
contexts.15 In addition to the question I asked above, that is, would this argument work if we swapped “Chinese

philosophy” for Latin American or Africana thought, let me pose another. Does Chinese philosophy deserve
more uptake in the United States than, say, Africana or Latin American or Asian American philosophies? Given
that “students of color are confronted with a curriculum that is almost monolithically white,”16 as Van Norden
writes, why not ask these students to study philosophical traditions that serve them or their interests better,
and not just assume that their professor’s appreciation of “Asian thought” will suffice in terms of exposing
students to difference? Why not draw from, and philosophically empower in the going, the range of experience
of these students of color?
A response might be that by introducing students to a “non-Western” perspective, like Chinese philosophy, one
exposes them ways of thinking that go beyond their sociohistorical contexts and thus do them some good: the
broadening of epistemic horizons. While I agree with this, my rejoinder is the following: First, are we really doing
students of color (particularly Black, Latinx, and indigenous students) a service by having them study a
perspective that is, to some extent, completely irrelevant to their point of view? Again, I do not mean this as a
knock against Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless, given the current racial, gender, and ethnic demographics of
professional philosophy, most students of color already occupy a position of marginality or “otherness” relative
to professional philosophy. By studying Anglo-Continental philosophical traditions these students are, in a sense,
being exposed to a different tradition. They are already becoming “worldly” (and, in fact, due to their lack of
privilege are forced to). My assumption here is that growing up nonwhite in a white dominated social context(s)
grants one a type of double-consciousness or mestiza/o or “border” consciousness that Gloria Anzaldúa writes
of.17 Regardless, if the exposure to epistemic difference or getting outside of one’s comfort zone is not working
for these students now, i.e., when nonwhite students study “white philosophers,” why assume that asking these
students to think about Chinese thought will be better? It might do white students some good, but does it help
nonwhite students?
Second, a central premise of much comparative philosophy (especially the East-meets-West variety) is the
notion that comparative philosophy gets one into the mind of an “Other.” I think this assumes a type of mastery
over others that is quite oppressive. Instead of assuming we now understand the world from a different point of
view, why not decenter the self in a way that allows for a world of others to be possible? This should be the main
goal of comparative philosophy. However, as it is currently taught, admittedly not by people as prepared as Van
Norden (and I say this because of his second chapter is a great example of what comparative philosophy ought
to look like), “getting into the minds of the other” is how many philosophers (and administrators) think of
comparative or “non- Western” philosophy.
When comparing ideas across cultures, especially when one attempts to transverse time as well as space, as one
does when studying Nahuatl (“Aztec”) philosophy for instance, a cautious and self- reflexive approach is best.
Rather than perpetuate debates as to whether or not one is accurately portraying the thought practices and
philosophical systems of conquered or foreign peoples, or for that matter debates about whether or not one can
transcend their own epistemic framework and avoid the charge of cultural chauvinism or the problem of
incommensurability, comparative philosophical practices are better appreciated for their reflexive capabilities. In
light of a lingering skepticism about whether or not transcultural meanings exist, comparative philosophers are
better off gaining a sense for how the comparative process challenges one’s preconceived views for what
constitutes philosophy in the first place. In short, comparative philosophy ought to assist more in decentering or
destabilizing the self rather than understanding “the Other,” as counterintuitive as this might seem. While I do
not mean to obviate the importance of or dismiss the possibility of cross-cultural communication, one
jeopardizes the significance of this methodological approach if one seeks to get inside the mind of other people.
Returning to my point, while Van Norden’s argument is complex and multifaceted, most of those who read it will
only see or hear the need to study “Oriental” philosophy. The book will garner a half- hearted read, one that
works in ideological ways to reify professional philosophy’s self-conception as well as several of its vices when it

comes to comparative work. That is to say, given that Van Norden personally works in Eastern traditions, his
examples and demonstration for how to do comparative philosophy will eclipse his larger message.
When professional philosophers see “non-Western” philosophy, most think about Buddhism, Confucianism, or
Daoism and seem to only have the so-called Far East in mind, never mind the Indian Subcontinent or Southeast
Asia. Not only does such an image of “non-Western” philosophy lead to the exclusion of Amerindian, Africana,
Latin American, and Caribbean traditions, since many of these have one foot in the West (which thus analytically
rules them out as “non-Western”), but it also reinforces an image of historical progress articulated by G. W. F.
Hegel who was famous for thinking that world history travels from “East” to “West.” When Anglo-European
philosophers study Eastern traditions they often understand themselves as glimpsing images of philosophy’s
past. Or, seeking to rebel from the Judeo-Christian underpinnings of Occidental culture (but nonetheless fans of
“spirituality”), many professional philosophers are attracted to the religiously diverse aspects of Eastern thought
(believe it or not, I have seen petty academics purport to be “Buddhist” only to frustrate those who claim to be
Catholic). All this is to say, when looking “East,” Western philosophers catch a glimpse of their pre-approved
past (assuming one does not venture too far east!). Most of what they see challenges Western thought in ways
permitted by Western thinkers: the move from orthodoxy to orthopraxy; from essentialist, substantialist or
static metaphysics to process ontologies; from philosophy as love of wisdom to contemplative and esoteric
understandings of “philosophy”; and more. All of these take place within a range of intellectual developments
that, although different enough to make possible points of differentiation, there remains enough overlap such
that comparisons can be made.
When confronted with “radical difference,” the type of difference that runs counter to the narrative of historical
development, one can start to view the dangers and risks involved in comparative endeavors. If Western
philosophers were to take Africana, Native American, Latin American, and Caribbean traditions seriously,
especially in terms of analyzing their philosophical perspective and values, one would be making quite the
political statement: it is to say, contrary to some of the most hallowed voices of the Western philosophical
canon, that Africa is not a continent devoid of reason; that mestiza ways of knowing constitute real philosophy;
that Nahuatl-speaking peoples, amidst the fact that some might have engaged in human sacrifice, were capable
of practicing formal philosophical investigation. Such a statement would undermine the sense of historical
progress that undergirds Western philosophy. The Native American philosopher Vine Deloria Jr. puts it the
following way,
Tribal people have traditionally been understood by Westerners as the last remnants of a hypothetical earlier
stage of cultural evolution, and this so-called “primitive stage” of human development is a necessary preamble to
any discussion of human beings and the meaning of their lives. Indeed, the stereotype of primitive peoples anchors
the whole edifice of Western social thought. We need the primitive so that we can distinguish Western civilization
from it and congratulate ourselves on the progress we have made.18

Deloria notes the difficulties he and others face when trying to explain how it is possible that indigenous peoples
practiced “philosophy.” Recognizing the reasoning skills of indigenous peoples necessarily undermines the
narrative of “progress,” “civility,” and “sophistication” that undergirds Western modernity, an idea reliant upon
relations of domination, processes of racialization and enslavement, as well as the de-historization of indigenous
peoples and their subsumption into “universal” (read European) history. All of these (and more) were the means
through which the reasoning faculties of non-Western cultures were covered-over and reduced to a caricature,
one that, as Deloria notes at the end of the above passage, bolsters the superiority of the Western modern
subject.

Towards a Liberating Philosophy
For me, when one speaks of diversity, the state of professional philosophy is not only at stake. I see the debates
about the nature of philosophical diversity as part of attempts at epistemic justice in light of European
colonization and the ways in knowledge is racialized, gendered, and politicized today. Influenced by liberation
philosophy (broadly construed), I believe that philosophy is not an end in itself but part of the struggle against
multiple forms of dehumanization and oppression. This is why, historically, some of the best works in philosophy
(cross-culturally speaking) are dialogues where neither of the interlocutors are reducible to the other but
represent differing points of view. Here, taking philosophical diversity seriously, empowering and acknowledging
the possibility that from where you think and who you are matters to philosophy, can lead to the “liberation” of
philosophy.
Van Norden believes in such an ideal, too. Seemingly taking a page out of liberatory philosophy, the last
chapters of Taking Back Philosophy provide arguments aimed at the sense of anti- intellectualism that pervades
“American” culture and claims about the uselessness of philosophy. Liberation philosophers put it the following
way, even if it is considered “the pursuit of truth” or “love of wisdom”: philosophical praxis should never be
reduced to the pursuit of truth or love wisdom for its own sake.19 In order for philosophy to be a praxis that
contributes to society, one has to take it out of the over-specialized manifestations that have formed inside of
academia. I am not saying that specialization in philosophy is irrelevant. However, it needs to be contextualized,
as Van Norden explains using Bertrand Russell’s work.20
Such an approach to a very nuanced understanding of philosophy restores a sense of sociality to philosophy. I
mean “sociality” in the sense of bringing into conversation the philosophical points of view of different cultures,
thus the expansion of philosophical thought and not just the demand that “others think like me.” But also
“sociality” in the sense making sure philosophers can explain to themselves and society at large the importance
of their work. That being said, there is an unspoken tension in the book that arises in light of Van Norden’s
emphasis on helping philosophy combat the anti-intellectualism of the current day, not to mention his desire to
restore philosophy to the sense of vocation held by Socrates, Confucius, or the Nahuatl-speaking tlamatinimi,
Quetzalcoatl. How can we afford to the do the former when immersed in a fight about the importance of critical
thinking, that is, when the very idea of philosophy is called into question? Manipulating the call for philosophy
to be more practical, many philosophers will find this to be a reason why diversification needs to be put off. You
can only do so much, or so the claim will go. Yet, as I hope to have explained above, practical relevance in
philosophy, if such a goal is desired, is achieved by meeting students where they are, by broadening
philosophical horizons in ways that take philosophers “outside” of themselves. On top of that, if the goal is to
factor in more minorities and women into the field, or indeed philosophers from outside the English-speaking
world, then demonstrating what philosophy can do to help combat totalizing forms of social identity and even
colonization might do to some good.
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